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SUPR EME COURT OF T HE STATE OF NEW YORK
NEW YORK COUNTY

------------------------------------------------------------------------- )(
In the Matter of

VERIFIED ANSWER
Petitioner,
Index No
For a Judgment Pursuant to Article 78 nf thc
Civil Practice Law and Rules,
- against NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT Of
CORRECTIONS AN D COMMUNITY SU PERVIS ION;
ANTHONY J. ANNUCCI, ACTING COMMISSIONER;
and TINA M. STANFORD, CI fAlR WOMAN OF T HE
NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF PAROLE,
Respondents.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------

)(

Respondents, the New York State Department o f Corrections and Community
Supervision (" OOCCS"); Anthony J. /\nnucci, the Acting Commissioner

or DOCCS ; and Tina

M. Stanford , Chairwoman of the New York State Board of Parole (the "Board''), by their
a ttorney, ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN, Attorney General of the State of' New York, answer the
Petition, dated December 11 , 20 15, as follows:
l.

Deny upon information and belief every material allegation contained m the

Petition except as admitted herein.
2.

The Board is a part of DOC CS.

1

The Board, consisting of' up to nineteen ( 19)

members appointed by the Governor and confirmed by the Senate for six-year terms, is tasked
primarily with deciding which inmates should be granted discretionary release to the community
along with imposing any condi tions of release.

1

DOCCS is a result of the merger of the New York State Department of Correcti on Services and
the Division of Parole in March 31, 20 11. The Board of Parole was part of the Di vision of
Parole.
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3.

Petitioner,

, 1s m the care and custody of

DOCCS and is an inmate at Albion Correctional Facility.

PETITIONER'S CRI MINALITY
4.

On August 31, l 996, Petitioner'

in a crib in Petitioner's home.

At the time of her death

was found dead

weighed fifteen and a half

pounds, the average weight of a six month old. In the months before her death,-

was

confined to the crib and hidden away from family members, neighbors, friends, school otlicials
and the Administration for Children Services. See Pre-Sentence Report submitted for in camera
review, attached as Exh. A; see also Pet. Exh. 25 (sentencing minutes), at 3:26 - 5:22.

5.

On October 24, 1997, Petitioner pied guilty and was sentenced to fifteen years to

life for murder in the second degree. See Sentence & Order of Commitment, attached as Exh. B.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

6.

Petitioner appeared before the Parole Board for a video interview on April 27,

20 l 5. See Transcript of Board Interview ("Transcript"), attached as Exh. C. The April 27, 20 l 5,
interview was Petitioner's third; she had previously been denied parole in 2011 and 2013. See
Pet. at p. 46. 2
7.

As preparation for her interview, attorneys from Lincoln Square Legal Services

Inc. helped Petitioner obtain and prepare documents for submission to the Parole Board. See Pet.
at p. 32; Exh. 2 l to Pet.
8.

During the interview, the Board asked Petitioner about the underlying crime.

Transcript at 4: 17 - 7:8.

2

Citations to "Pet." refer to pages or exhibits in the Petition.

2
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9.

The l3oard asked Petitioner abou t her rehabili tative e ffo rts, s pecitically what

programs she participated in while incarcerated and how those programs influenced her. f<l. at
8:4 -9: 15.

The Board specifically asked Petitioner to discuss the program that was most

significant for her.
I0.
submitted .

hl:. at 9:2-15.

The Uoard informed Petitioner that it would consider the packet of documents she

hl:. at 2: I 7-20.

T he Board specifically asked Petitioner ·'[ils there anything else from

this packet that you particularly would like to highlight fo r us?"

Id. at 9: 16- 17. Petitioner

replied, '·No ma 'am. It's self-explanatory."
I I.

The Board also asked Petitioner about her prospective plans, if released.

specifically the deportation order to -

where she intended to live, and he r e mployment

prospects. Id . at 9: 19- 10:24.
12.

At the conclusion of her interview, Peti tioner was denied release to parole.

12: 1-1 3:8; see also Parole Board Release Decision Notice, attached as Exh. D.

!fl at

In denying

Petitioner's release, the Board considered the relevant statutory factors, including Petitioner's
risk to society, rehabilitation efforts, and her needs for successful reentry into the community.

Id.

at

12: 13- 18.
13.

Petitioner, through her attorneys, appealed the Board's decision on May 19, 2015.

Pet. at p. 7. The Appeals Unit of the Parole Board received Petitioner's brief in support of the
appeal on July 2, 20 15. See Administrative Appeal Brief, attached as Exh. E.
14.

The Appeals Unit affirmed the Board's decision on September 24, 2015. See

Appeals Un it Decision, attached as Exh. F.
15.

Petitioner thereafter commenced this Article 78 proceeding seeking an order

vacating the April 27, 2015 denial of parole and granting a new parole release interview .

...

.)
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FIRST 08,JECTION lN POINT OF LAW
MANY OF PETITIONER'S ARGUMENTS
HA VE NOT BEEN PRESERVED FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW

16.

'·[Ilt is well settled that an argument

not

raised for the

time before the
430 (2009)

(citations omitted). A court is ''limited in a CPLR article 78

nrn,f'Pf>ft

to reviewing '

actually raised before the administrative agency making the determination."' Matter of Erdheim
~ = ~ , 7 A.D.3d 876, 877 (3d Dep't. 2004) (quoting Matter of Roggemann v. Bane, 223

A.D.2d 854, 856 (3d Dep't. 1996)). Thus, any issues raised by a petitioner in an Article 78
proceeding which were not raised before the administrative agency are not preserved for judicial
Matter of Hernandez v. Alexander, 64 A.D.3d 819 (3d Dep't. 2009) (matter not

review.

raised before the Board on administrative appeal not preserved for Article 78 review); Matter of
Shapard v. Zon, 30 A.D.3d 1098 (4th Dep't. 2006) (same).
A.

Objections Not Made to the Parole Board Have Been \Vaived.

17.

Any issues now raised by Petitioner which could have been addressed during her

interview, including, but not limited to, any alleged errors in any DOCCS or other records, but
were not raised at the parole interview, have been waived. See Matter of Vanier v. Travis, 274
A.D.2d 797 (3d Dep't. 2000); Matter of Flores v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 210 A.D.2d 555
(3d Dep't. 1994); Matter of Morel v. Travis, 278 A.D.2d 580 (3d Dep't. 2000), Iv. denied, 96
N. Y.2d 752 (200 l ).
18.

In this Article 78 proceeding, Petitioner claims, inter alia, that: the Board did not

provide her a complete interview because it did not let her read her personal statement (Pet. at p.
43 ); the Board failed to consider her sentencing minutes (id. at p. 44); and there are errors in her
COMP AS assessment (id. at p. 46). Petitioner had an opportunity to raise these issues with the
4
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but did not do so.

the

Therefore, these arguments have not been

judicial

8.

Matters Not Raised before the Appeals Unit Have Not Been Preserved.
19.

part of her administrative appeal of the Parole Board's denial of parole,

Petitioner-through the same attorneys who represent her here-submitted a brief.

Exh. E.

Therein, Petitioner argued that: (I) the Board failed to provide Petitioner with a complete interview
because it did not let her read her personal statement; (2) the Board stated that it did not have the
sentencing minutes, but Petitioner was able to obtain the minutes from DOCCS prior to the
interview; (3) the Board relied upon an "OMH report" in Petitioner's parole file, which was not
provided in response to Petitioner's request; (4) the Board unlawfully withheld or redacted portions
of Petitioner's parole file; (5) the COMP AS assessment contained erroneous information; (6) the
Board failed to provide detailed reasons for its deeision; and (7) the Board's decision was arbitrary
and capricious because it did not consider statements from the victim's representatives. Id.
20.

As discussed above, Petitioner waived certain objections by not raising them during

her parole interview, including any alleged issues with the documents considered by the Board.
Thus, those issues were not preserved for review by the Appeals Unit on administrative appeal, or
the Court in this Article 78 proceeding.
21.

In addition, many of the arguments in the Petition were not raised before the

Appeals Unit. These arguments include, inter alia:
•

Petitioner's mental health and substance abuse issues were integrally intertwined with
her crime, yet the Board did not give her current mental health and sobriety the
consideration it was due (Pet. at pp. 32-35);

5
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•

The 13oard was required

to consider DOCCS'

recommendati ons regarding

deportation but did not do so (Pet. at p. 36);
•

The Board's decision that release was incompatible with the welfare of society is
inconsistent with

Petitioner's

proactively seeking therapeutic programs and

opportunities for rehabilitation above and beyond the programs DOCCS offers (Pet.
at 37);
•

The Board's conclusion that M s . - poses a risk to community safety is
inconsistent with her educational accomplishments (Pet. at pp. 38-40);

•

The Board's conclusion that release was incompatible with the welfare of society is
inconsistent with Petitioner's submission of comprehensive post-release plans (Pet. at
pp. 40-41).

Accordingly, these issues have also not been properly preserved for judicial review.

SECOND OBJECTION IN POINT OF LAW
THE PAROLE BOARD'S DETERMINATION
NOT TO RELEASE PETITIONER ON PAROLE
WAS MADE INACCORDANCE WITH THE LAW
AND WAS NOT ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS
OR IMPERMISSIBL Y CONCLUSORY
A.

The Parole Board Considered AH Relevant Statutory Factors and Based Its Decision
on Permissible Factors
22.

[tis well established that the Board's release decisions are discretionary. So long

as the Board's discretion is exercised in keeping with statutory requirements, its decisions are not
s ubject to judicial review. See Matter of Saunders v. Travis, 238 A.D.2d 688 (3d Dep' t 1997);
People ex ~el. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 131 (1st Oep't 1983).
As the Court of Appeals has explained, " [t)o require the [Board] to act m
accordance with judicial expectations . . . would substantially undermine the [legislative]

6
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to the [ Board I and not the courts."

to entrust

( 1980) (internal quotation marks omitted).
A

the

to

cannot be disturbed in the absence

of a convincing demonstration by Petitioner that it was affected by irrationality bordering on
impropriety.
69 ( 1980); see
~~'" 277 A.D.2d 576 (3d Dep't 2000). A showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety is
a high bar for a party to surmount.
Dep't 2007) ("In order to set aside a determination of the Parole Board, the Petitioner bears the
heavy burden of establishing that the determination was the result of irrationality bordering on

1997).
25.

According to Executive Law§ 259-i(2)(c)(A)(i)-(viii), when determining whether

an inmate should be released on parole after the minimum period of imprisonment imposed by
the sentencing court, the Board must consider:
(i) the institutional record including program goals and
accomplishments, academic achievements, vocational education,
training or work assignments, therapy and interactions with staff
and inmates; (ii) performance, if any, as a participant in a
temporary release program; (iii) release plans including
community resources, employment, education and training and
support services available to the inmate; (iv) any deportation order
issued by the federal government against the inmate while in the
custody of the department and any recommendation regarding
deportation made by the commissioner of the department pursuant
to [Corr. Law § 147]; (v) any statement made to the board by the
crime victim ·or the victim's representative, where the crime victim
is deceased or is mentally or physically incapacitated; (vi) the
length of the determinate sentence to which the inmate would be
subject had he or she received a sentence pursuant to section 70. 70
or section 70.71 of the penal law for a felony defined in article two
7
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two hundred twenty-one of the penal
of the offense with due consideration to
length of sentence and recommendations of
district attorney, the attorney for the
probation report as well as consideration
and aggravating factors, and activities following
arrest prior to confinement; and (viii) prior criminal record,
including the nature and pattern of offenses, adjustment to any
previous probation or parole supervision and institutional
confinement.
Law 259-i(2)(c)(A)(i)-(viii); see
26.

Matter of Silmon, 95 N.Y.2d 470 at 476-77.

The statute also provides that "[d]iscretionary release on parole shall not be

granted merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined,
but after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will
live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with
the welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine
respect for law." Exec. Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A); see also Matter of Walker v. Travis, 252 A.D.2d
360 (1st Dep't 1998).
27.

Contrary to Petitioner's claim (See Pet. at pp. 30-41 ), the Board clearly

considered all the relevant statutory factors during the parole interview. First, in satisfaction of
Executive Law§ 259-i(2)(c)(A)(vii), which focuses on the seriousness of the offense, the Board
discussed the murder and its surrounding circumstances. Transcript at 3:21-7:8. Before moving
on, the Board also gave Petitioner an opportunity to further discuss the crime and sentence. Id. at
7:9-11.
28.

ln satisfaction of Executive Law§ 259-i(2)(c)(A)(i), which looks at the inmate's

institutional record, the Board then ·asked Petitioner about her rehabilitative efforts, specifically
asking her about what programs she participated in while incarcerated. Id. at 7:12-8:19, 9:2-17.
The Board specifically noted its receipt and consideration of letters regarding Petitioner's
8
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psychiatric status. fd. at 8-2 0-2 1. The Board also discussed Petitioner's institutional history (id.
at 8: 11-19) and disciplinary record (id. at 8:22-25).
The Board acknowledged receipt of documents submitted on Petitioner's behalf,

29.

and informed Petitioner that the submissions would be considered. Id. at 2: 17-20. T he Board
specifically asked Petitioner if there was anything particular in her submissions that s he wished
to " highlight."

1.d. at 9: 16-17. Petitioner declined, stating that " It's self-ex planatory." Id. at

9: 18.
30.

In satisfaction of Executive Law§ 259-i(2)(c)(A)(iii), which looks to the inmate's

release plans, the Board asked Petitioner about where she intends to live and post-release plans.
ld. at 9: 19- I 0:24.
3 1.

In satisfaction of Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A)(iv), which concerns any

deportation order issued by the federal government, the Board asked about Petitioner' s plans if
she were to be released and deported t
32.

fd. at 9:19- 10: 17.

The Board also asked Petitioner about her prior drug use (id. at 3:21-4:4), and her

mental health (id. at 4: I 0-1 6). Those factors are relevant to her rehabilitative efforts and release
plan.
33.

The Board also noted for the record that it had reviewed the COMPAS Risk

Assessment, wh ich is relevant to Petitioner's rehabilitative effort. Id. at 3: 13-4:9.
34.

Even if Peti tioner's claim that the Board did not consider all the relevant statutory

factors is tme, which it is not, the case Jaw is clear that the failure to discuss all of the relevant
factors at the interview does not provide a basis for upsetting the Board's decision. See Matter of
Morales v. Travis, 260 A.D.2d 71 0 (3d Dep't. 1999); Matter of Waters v. New York State Div. of
Parole, 252 A.D.2d 759 (3d Dep't. 1998); Matter of Davis v. New York State Div. of Parole, 114

9
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41

==~~=~~~=-~=-"'=~=:-=-~=' 91 A.D.2d
told Petitioner that it considered the statutory n,,..,,",."
would

is a
welfare

""'''"''" and would so deprecate the serious nature of the crime
12.

Although each factor must be considered, the Board is not required to discuss
each factor during the interview, see Matter of Griffin v. Dennison, 32 A.0.3d 1060, 1061 (3d
Dep't. 2006), or mention each of the requisite factors in its decision.

Matter of Nicoletta v.

~=-~~=~~'--=~===, 74 A.0.3d 1609, 1609 (3d Dep't 2010). Rather, the Board is
free to mention only ''the most compelling factors influencing its decision, [and is] under no
obligation to discuss every factor it considered." Matter of Angel v. Travis, I A.0.3d 859, 860
(3d Dep't. 2003).
36.

When an inmate challenges a decision of the Board that denied him or her parole,

the court's role

not to assess whether the Board gave the proper weight to the relevant factors,

but only whether the Board followed the [statute] and rendered a determination that is supported,
and not contradicted, by the facts in the record." Matter of Comfort v. New York State Div. of
Parole, 68 A.0.3d 1295, 1296 (3d Dep't. 2009).
37.

Moreover, in the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not

consider the statutory factors set out under Executive Law § 259-i, it must be presumed that the
Board fulfilled its duty. See Herbert, 97 A.0.2d 128 at 133.
38.

Parole release is a discretionary function of the Board, and Petitioner has not met

her burden of demonstrating that the Board abused its discretion in denying her release, or that
its determination was arbitrary and capricious. See Matter of Garcia, 239 A.0.2d at 239 (holding

10
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m

"the
determining

will

and who will remain in prison,

a petitioner who

to obtain

on the grounds that the Board did not properly consider all of

judicial

or that an improper factor was considered,
39.

a heavy burden.

The Board is permitted to consider the brutality and depravity of the offense and

the inmate's disregard for the life of another human being.

Matter of Dudley v. Travis, 227

A.D.2d 863 (3d Dep't. 1996); Matter of Hakim v. Travis, 302 A.D.2d 821 (3d Dep't. 2003). It is
within the Board's discretion to conclude that the violent nature of the crime is an overriding
consideration warranting the denial of parole release.

Rodeney v. Dennison, 24 AD.3d

1152 (3d Dep't. 2005). The Board does not need to refer to each and every one of the requisite
factors in its decision or give them equal weight. See Matter of Siao-Pao v. Dennison, 51 A.D.3d
105 (1st Dep't. 2008); Matter of King v. New York State Div. of Parole, 190 AD. 2d 423 (1st
Dep't. 1993), aff'd, 83 N.Y. 2d 788 (1994); Matter of Blasich v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 48
AD. 3d 1029 (3d Dep't. 2008); Matter of Thompson v. New York State Div. of Parole, 30 AD.3d
746 (3d Dep't. 2006); Matter of De Lagarde v. New York State Div. of Parole, 23 AD.3d 876 (3d
Dep't. 2005); Matter of Legette v. Travis, 11 AD.3d 849 (3d Dep't. 2004); Matter of Mata v.
Travis, 8 AD.3d 570 (2d Dep't. 2004); Matter of Ek v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 307 AD.2d
433 (3d Dep't. 2003). Accordingly, the Board's emphasis on the violent nature of the crime does
not establish irrationality bordering on impropriety. See Matter of Pulliam v. Dennison, 38 AD.3d
963 (3d Dep't. 2007); Matter of Sterling v. Dennison, 38 AD.3d 1145 (3d Dep't. 2007) ("The
Board was not required to give each factor equal weight and co_uld, as it did, choose to place greater
emphasis on the violent nature of petitioner's crimes.").

11
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the reasons

40.

Petitioner

are

N.Y. Misc. LEXIS
that parole may be denied

(Sup.

Courts

routinely held

(citing

upon the

~=-~'"-==' 111 A.D.2d 839 (2d Dep't 1985);

471 N.Y.S.2d 630 (2d Dep't 1984);

=~~=~~==~, 99 A.D.2d 546,
93 A.D.2d 958 (3d Dep't

1983).
41.

Furthermore, while the Board is statutorily required to consider criteria relevant to

the individual inmate, the Court of Appeals has held that the "Board need not expressly discuss
each of these guidelines in its determination." Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of

~=, 119 A.D.3d 1268 (3d Dep't. 2014) (quoting Matter of King v. New York State Div. of
Parole, 83 N.Y.2d 788, 791 (1994)).
42.

Thus, Petitioner's contention, that the Board erred because it considered

Petitioner's commission of the instant offense to the exclusion of other factors for discretionary
release to parole supervision and that the Board failed to acknowledge in its decision Petitioner's
accomplishments regarding her institutional record, lacks merit. See Transcript at 12: 13-18.
43.

The Board decided that Petitioner's release "would be incompatible with the

welfare of society and would so deprecate the serious nature of the crime as to undermine respect
for the law." Transcript at 12:8-12. Petitioner argues that the board's decision was conclusory
because it failed to evaluate Petitioner's rehabilitative efforts and explain why her release would
be incompatible with the welfare of society.
44.

First, as discussed above, the Board clearly took into account Petitioner's

participation in rehabilitative programs, and it was Petitioner who declined to go into further

12
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detail. bel ieving that her submiss io ns were ..self-explanatory." In additio n. Petitio ner's argument
that the Board c.lid no t provide her a complete parole interview when it a ll egedly refused to let
her read her personal statement (Pet. a t p. 43) is fallacious. When· given a n o pportunity to relay
the mean ing of the letter in her own words rather than reading them off of the page. Petitioner
stated:
Al the time of my crime I was mentally ill . ma'am. and throughout the years I
have worked very hard to try and understand why and how I could commit such
an act. During my rehabilitation. l have done MICA programs. l have taken oneon-one the rapy over te n years, ma ' am. l have wo rked on
and
the crime itself is never going to change, but I have. l have changed.
Transcript at 8:4-10. Petitioner' s statement wholly fa ils to show any insight or remo rse into her
crime, and therefore the argument that, by asking her to para phrase he r personal statement, the
Board fai led to grant her a complete interview, o r failed to properly assess her insight and
remorse, is unavailing.
45.

Petitioner also claims that the Board's decision that her re lease would be

incompatible with the welfare of society was irratio nal because it did not define " which
society

o r New Yo rk." Pet at p. 20. Any argument that the Board sho uld only be

concerned with the safety of New Yorke rs is nonsensical.
46.

Moreover, contrary Lo Pe titioner's contentio n, the Board' s decis io n was

sufficiently detailed to inform Petitioner o f the reasons for the denial of parole. See Transcript
12:6-1 3:7. Accordingly, it satisfied the criteria set forth in Executive Law § 259-i. See Matter of
Siao-Pao v Dennison, 11 N.Y.3d 777 (2008) (holding that "[t)he Board's written determination,
while less than detailed than it might be, is not merely "conclusory" and so does not violate the
law); Matter of Whitehead v. Russi, 20 l A.D.2d 825 (3d Dep' t. I 993).

13
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8.

Petitioner's Own Opinion about Herself is Immaterial for Parole Release
Essentially, the premise of Petitioner's
candidate

is that,

release, the Board's decision to deny her release had to

a

was
been

on

their failure to consider all of the statutory factors.
48.

Petitioner's own speculative belief that she is an ideal candidate for

that

she will not violate the law upon release, and that her release will not pose a threat to the safety
and well-being of the community, does not override the determination and discretion of the
Board.
49.

Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c) expressly provides that discretionary release on

parole will not be granted merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties
while confined. Discretionary release to parole is only warranted after considering and weighing
each of the relevant statutory factors. See Matter of Guerin v. New York State Div. of Parole,
276 A.D.2d 899, 900 (3d Dep't. 2000); Matter of Larrier v. New York State Bd. of Parole
Appeals Unit, 283 A.D.2d 700 (3d Dep 't 2001 ); Matter of Vasquez v. State of New York
Executive Department Division of Parole, 20 A.D.3d 668 (3d Dep't. 2005); Matter of Wellman
v. Dennison, 23 A.D.3d 974 (3d Dep't. 2005); Matter of Walker, 252 A.D.2d at 360.
50.

Petitioner's achievements while in prison, regardless of how significant she believes

they are, do not automatically entitle her to parole release. See Matter of Faison v. Travis, 260
A.D.2d 866 (3d Dep't 1999); Matter of Pulliam v Dennison, 38 A.D.3d 963 (3d Dep't 2007). The
Board's determination that the inmate's achievements are outweighed by the severity of the
crime is properly within the Board's discretion. See Matter of Santos v. Evans, 81 A.D.3d 1059,
916 N.Y.S.2d 325 (3d Dep't. 2011); Matter of Kirkpatrick v. Travis, 5 A.D.3d 385 (2d Dep't.

14
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17 A.D.3d 30 t ( l st Dep't.
,~=~~=~,41

I.

In

==~~~~~==~~:c==,

violent nature of his

119 A.D.3d l

prison record.

the petitioner was a

D.3dat 17.
(3d Dep't

14),

However, because of the

murder, the court affirmed the dismissal of the petition, holding

that "[ o ]ur settled jurisprudence is that a parole determination made in accordance with the
requirements of the statutory guidelines is not subject to further judicial review unless it is
affected by irrationality bordering on impropriety . . . We emphasize that this Court has
repeatedly reached the same result, on the same basis, when reviewing denials of parole to
petitioners whom we recognized as having exemplary records and as being compelling
candidates for release." Id. at 1272 (citing cases).
52.

The court further stated "[i]n short, the statutory language of Executive Law §

259-i (5) dictating our limited power of review and the interpretation of that language by the
Court of Appeals remain unchanged. Accordingly, inasmuch as the Board has not violated the
statutory mandates and its determination does not exhibit irrationality bordering on impropriety
under either our precedent or that of the Court of Appeals, its discretion is absolute and beyond
review in the courts." Id. at 1275 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
C.

Petitioner's Arguments Regarding the COMP AS are Unavailing

53.

Petitioner claims that there is erroneous information in her COMPAS, and that the

Board therefore relied on incorrect information in making its decision.
this argument is meritless.

15

Pet. at p. 46. However,
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Petitioner, through counsel,
at p.

her COMP AS on April

Petitioner failed to

any issues of

20 I

before the

alleged errors in her

at the interview. Therefore, as discussed above, she waived this objection.
Notwithstanding the above, the claimed errors in the COMPAS, namely, stating
that Petitioner's "Prison Release Status" was '·Max out" and categorizing "History of Violence"
as a "Crimogenic Need" are immaterial.

The Board clearly was aware that Petitioner was

eligible for parole. Thus, any error in the "Prison Release Status" field of the COMP AS is de
The argument regarding DOCCS' organization of the COMPAS is similarly
unavailing. The fact that DOCCS places "History of Violence" under "Crimogenic Need" had
no impact because, as the Board recognized during the interview, the COMPAS still reflected
that Petitioner had a low chance of reoffending.

See COMPAS, attached as Exh. G; Transcript

at 3: 1 16.
56.

Petitioner also argues that the Board's decision should be vacated because the low

risk scores under the CO MP AS contradict the Board's articulation of the statutory rationale in
support of its decision. Pet. at p. I 9. However, similar to the other documents and information
the Board considers under section 259-i(2)(c)(A) of the Executive Law, the Board may place
whatever weight that it deems appropriate to the information derived from a scored COMPAS
Re-Entry Risk Assessment when making its release decision. See Matter of Montane v. Evans,
116 A.D.3d 197 (3d Dep't. 2014) (leave to appeal granted 23 N.Y.3d 903 (2014)); Rivera v.
N.Y. Div., 119 A.D.3d 1107 (3d Dep't 2014); Matter of Garfield v. Evans, 108 A.D.3d 830 (3d
Dep't. 2013).

The COMPAS does not abrogate or diminish the Board's obligation to consider

and weigh all of the statutory factors and render a decision under the governing standard set forth
in Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A). Accordingly, Petitioner's argument is meritless.
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I>.

The Hoard's Decision Was Made In Accordance with The Law, and The Record
Does Not Show that The Hoard Failed to Consider Any Relevant Information
that the Board failed to

is no merit to
hearing parole submissions (Pet. at pp.

her pre-

l ), her written "personal statement" (Id. at p. 4 3 ),

statements submitted by representatives of the victim (Id. at pp.
recommendations regarding deportation (ld. at p. 36).

explained above,

or DOCCS'
Board is presumed

to have professionally discharged its responsibilities.
529 U.S. at 244.

Absent a convincing showing to the contrary, there 1s a

presumption that the Board has acted properly in following the statutory requirements.

See

Silmon, 95 N.Y.2d at 476.
58.

The interview record clearly shows that the Board considered Petitioner's

submissions. Transcript at 2: 17-20. Further, the Board stated that it had considered all of the
statutory factors, including the nature of the offense, Petitioner's rehabilitative efforts while
incarcerated, disciplinary infractions, program participation, her risks to society, and her plans
for release. Id. at 12:14-18, 13:1-3. Thus, Petitioner's argument is unavailing.

E.

The Fact that the Hoard Did Not Consider the Sentencing Minutes Did Not Render
Its Decision Irrational to the Point of Impropriety
59.

Petitioner argues that the Board improperly failed to consider the sentencing

minutes from the Supreme Court, New York County.
60.

During the interview, the Board informed Petitioner that it had requested the

sentencing minutes, but did not receive them, and therefore they could not be considered.
Transcript at 3:4-8. The Board stated that it had an affidavit from the senior court reporter
stating that the minutes were not available. Id.; see also Affidavit of Frank Rizzo, attached as
Exh. H.
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minutes from

6L
resoo11ue:a to the
them

that the

sentencing court, and
minutes were not

not render its decision irrational to the

point of impropriety. ~=~~~~=~~~=~~.==, 70 A.D.3d 1106 (3d Dept.
IO);==~~=~~~~~=~~~~=' 68 A.D.3d 1339 (3d Dept. 2009);

62.

Petitioner claims that she obtained a copy of the sentencing minutes, except for a
as part of its information request prior to the

missing

from DOCCS on April 20,

interview.

Pet. at p. 44. The Board relied on the sentencing court's affidavit regarding the

availability of the minutes. Transcript at 3:5-8. The Board also stated to Petitioner that "You
were there at the time of sentencing, so if there's anything that was said that you think would be
important for us to know, you can let us know during the interview." Id. at 3:9-11. Petitioner
replied "Yes, ma'am." Id. at 3:12. However, Petitioner did not challenge the Board's statement
that the sentencing minutes were unavailable, inform the Court that she had a copy of the
sentencing minutes (with a missing page), or otherwise discuss the sentencing proceedings, at the
interview. Therefore, she has waived the argument.
63.

Even if this argument has not been waived, the Board's failure to consider the

sentencing minutes amounted to harmless error.

The Board is required to consider "the

seriousness of the offense with due consideration to the type of sentence, length of sentence and
recommendations of the sentencing court, the district attorney, the attorney for the inmate, the
pre-sentence probation report as well as consideration of any mitigating and aggravating factors,
and activities following arrest prior to confinement." Executive Law§ 259-i(2)(c)(A)(vi). There
is no indication that the sentencing minutes contained any recommendation as to Petitioner's
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the fact that the

sentence or

did not consider the

on the 2011 affidavit from the New York

to
did not
A.D.3d 1196
3d 1039 (2d Dept. 2010).

F.

The Law Prevents Petitioner From Obtaining Confidential Information
64.

Petitioner argues that the Board unlawfully withheld documents or portions of

documents from her.

Pet at 45.

As an initial matter, there is no indication that Petitioner

challenged the alleged withholding of such records.

9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8000.5(d).

Thus,

Petitioner has not exhausted her administrative remedies with regard to the withholding of any
records, and the issue is not justiciable.
65.
merit.

Nevertheless, Petitioner's arguments regarding undisclosed information lack

Any undisclosed information was based upon legitimate reasons, including, but not

limited to, confidential information based upon evaluative opinions by staff, and information in
the presentence investigative report that may not be disclosed without court order.
66.

Petitioner's contention that the redacted information from the COMPAS should

have been made available to her (Pet. at p. 45) is unavailing. Such information concerns intraagency materials containing evaluative opinions by staff in connection with the preparation of
the COMPAS for the Board's review.

Therefore, the information was legitimately withheld

from disclosure to Petitioner. See Public Officers Law §87(2)(g).
67.

The confidential information expresses the author's op1mon regarding the

appropriateness of the Petitioner's possible release, which 1s evaluative in nature.

3

Such

The missing page at least partly includes a statement by Petitioner. See Pet. Exh. 25 at 7:25.
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A.D.2d

I (3d Dep't

11 A.D.3d
A.D.2d 781 (3d Dep't. 1997).

68.

Any similar evaluations or assessments

by parole

including page

two of the Parole Board report or a DOCCS recommendation regarding her deportation, would
be exempt from disclosure for the same reason. The fact that the Parole Board would consider
such information prior to rendering its decision does not constitute sufficient reason, i.e. good
cause, to release them. See 9 N.Y.C.R.R. §8000.5(c)(2)(i).

69.

Petitioner's claim that she was allegedly unlawfully deprived of having access to

the Office of Mental Health report (Pet. at p. 45) is also meritless. Petitioner did not request
mental health documents prior to her interview.

Pet. Exh. 24; see also Mental Health

Hygiene Law § 33.16 (regarding access to mental health clinical records). Moreover, as
discussed above, any documents from the Office of Mental Health would contain clinical
information which is diagnostic in nature and exempt from disclosure.

THIRD OBJECTION IN POINT OF LAW
PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO DIRECT RELEASE TO PAROLE
SUPERVISION
70.

Petitioner requests that the Court vacate the determination of the Board, and order

Petitioner's immediate release, or, in the alternative, a de novo interview. See Notice of Petition.
However, Petitioner may not obtain direct release to parole supervision in this proceeding.
71.

It is well settled that the appropriate remedy in an Article 78 proceeding

challenging the denial of parole is a remand to the Board for a new interview. See Matter of Ifill
v. Evans, 87 A.D.3d 776, 777 (3d Dept. 2011) ("the appropriate remedy for a successful
20
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determination is annulment of that determination and remand for a

to a parole

A.D.2d 837, 838 (3d Dept. 2011);

new

A.D.2d 266, 266 (l st Dept. 1996); Matter
A.D.2d 944, 944-45 (4th Dept 1994);

==~==~~=,

A.D.2d
Ct., Richmond Cty. Aug.

1989) ("Any deprivation to the petitioner's due process rights are

limited to a new hearing and upon such cure, he is not entitled to any further relief"). Indeed, the
courts have acknowledged that the Executive Law gives the Board "sole discretionary powers to
review an inmate's eligibility for release." Matter of Canales v. Hammock, 105 Misc. 2d 71, 75
(Sup. Ct, Richmond Cty. Aug. 28, 1980). Thus, when courts have been confronted with flawed
parole release interviews, they have not released inmates but rather ordered that new interviews
be conducted.

People ex rel. Haderxhanji v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d

368 (1st Dep't 1983) (denying habeas petition brought to challenge improper parole interview on
the ground that the petitioner was entitled only to a new interview and not to release).
72.

Consequently, under the well-established law, the only authorized relief, even if

the Court were to grant the Petition, is a de novo interview.
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CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, Respondents respectfully request that the court grant the following

relief:
(a) a judgment confirming Respondents' determination and dismissing the Petition;
(b) and for such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
Dated: New York, NY
February 10, 2016
ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN
Attorney General of the
State of New York
Attorney for the Respondents
By:

Ya Fu
As i~tant Attorney General
12 Broadway - 24th Floor
New York, New York 10271
(212) 416-8582
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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
NEW YORK COUNTY

-------------------------------- ---------------------------------------- :x:
In the Matter o f

VERIFICATION
Peti tioner,
For a Judgment Pursuant to Article 78
Civil Practice Law and Rules,

or the

Index No.

- against NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECT IONS AND COMMUNITY SU PERVISION;
ANTHONY J. ANN UCCI, ACTING CO MM ISS IONER;
and TINA M. STANFORD, CHAIRWOMAN OF THE
NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF PAROLE,
Respondents.

------------------------------------------------------------------------- :x:
YAN FU, ESQ., an attorney admitted to practice before the courts

or the

State of New

York, affirms and states as fo llows:
I am an Assistant Attorney General in the Office of ERIC T. SCH EIDERM/\.N,
Anomey General of the State of New York, attorney for Respondents in the above-captioned
proceeding. I have read the annexed answer, know the contents thereoC and state that the same
are true to my knowledge, except for those matters alleged to be upon information and belief:
and as to those matters I believe them to be true.

Executed February 10, 2016

